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1. Introduction
Seven years after the outbreak of the financial crisis recovery is still sluggish around the world.
This is especially true for the Euro area where slow recovery, solvency crisis in peripheral coun-
tries and deflationary pressure intensified the crisis. While inflation rates are already low at
0.3% for the Euro area, Italy’s inflation rate is even lower at 0.2%.1 Even more worrisome are
developments in Spain and Greece where the HICP has already been negative for May 2015.
Deflation may entail several problems for the Euro area. First, as Tobin (1975) already argues,
if the expected inflation rate is lower next period consumers may delay consumption demand.
Secondly, the real interest rate may rise, triggering strong adverse macro feedback effects. Third,
there is the risk of contagion effects. If one country suffers from a shortfall in aggregate demand,
other countries may be drawn into a downward trend. Sluggish recovery of other regions may
follow and lead to some wide spread “secular stagnation”.
Although there is no precise definition of the term, Teulings and Baldwin (2014) argue that the
profession agrees on certain characteristics, which appear to emerge now in particular in Europe.
In fact, even though “secular stagnation” was first discussed in the USA,2 Europe seems to face
a higher risk of falling victim to it than the USA. Although interest rates are low in Europe, some
countries are already experiencing negative inflation rates, while low investment demand may
require negative real interest rates to equalize saving and investment at a higher employment
level.
Besides the negative effects of deflation on aggregate demand, one also has to be aware of debt
deflation (Fisher 1933): even though the nominal interest may be low, a negative inflation rate
will still increase the real interest rate, as well as real debt. This will lead to a rising burden of
debt and further liabilities when debt is already high. Firms will then hold back investment and
households postpone purchases of durable consumer goods. What one might see as a great peril
is that – due to rising real debt – new insolvencies may arise in the Euro area, insolvencies of
firms, in the housing sector, and in the banking sector. Though the rise of real debt and the pro-
cess of secular stagnation appears to be slow currently, once insolvencies re-emerge, a financial
crisis and financial stress maybe powerful forces to produce further downward movements.
While Fisher’s focus is on private households or firms when analyzing debt deflation, we are
analyzing the effects of deflationary shocks on the term structure/yield curve. A debt deflation
may trigger financial stress, in particular as Williams and Taylor (2009) argue, through a sudden
rise in interbank borrowing rates and a rise in credit spreads. This may then give, as soon as
sovereign debt is involved, rise to an increase in sovereign bond spreads, which appears as the
long run peril, since many long term borrowing contracts, such as mortgages are linked to long
term interest rates. So what one might want to analyze more properly is the effects of a decrease
in the price level on the term structure of interest rates when financial stress is involved. As a
measure of the interest rate spread we can take, for example, the spread between nominal long-
term (10 years) and short-term (3 months) interest rates. We bring in here the term structure,
since this is of particular interest for private sector contracts, specially for mortgages and other
credit cost, which are linked to long-term interest rates.
1HICP for May 2015; https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/hicp/html/inflation.en.html
2See Summers (2014) and Gordon (2000).
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Note that typically only short term interest rates, the federal funds rate/marginal lending rate,
are employed in economic modeling of output and price dynamics, while long-term interest
rates are neglected. But as Williams and Taylor (2009: 59) state, with respect to the US 2008-9
meltdown:
. . . this is a simplification because in reality the transmission mechanism involves
interest rates on longer term or higher risk loans. For example, it is the Libor rate,
not the overnight federal funds rate, that is linked to the interest rates on trillions
of dollars in loans and securities, thus influencing spending decisions. As long
as the spreads between interest rates are small or constant, as they have been in the
interbank market for many years, ignoring movements in the spreads is a reasonable
simplifying assumption. But the spreads have been anything but small or constant
in the recent crisis.
As the aforementioned authors, and others, argue, the term structure of the interest rate is a
major driving force of persistent credit spreads and high long term interest rates for the private
sector.3 What we will focus on in our theory of debt deflation is the effect of the term structure of
interest rates on economic activity,4 which seems to be particularly important for the sovereign
debt driven Euro area countries. The above cited recent literature makes a clear case for the
interaction between macroeconomic factors and the term structure. We thus think this should
become a center piece of a study of debt deflation mechanisms, in particular as much as Europe
is concerned.
In fact, in times of a severe economic and financial crisis, accompanied by negative inflation
rates, government expenditures are very likely to exceed government revenue due to the working
of automatic stabilizers and/or stimulus packages. If nominal interest rates on long-term bonds
are to rise substantially due to uncertainty about future developments of the fiscal finances and
the economy, then effects on real rates will be even more pronounced. This will limit the capa-
bility of fiscal authorities to stimulate the economy, or create even a slowly moving sovereign
debt crisis (Semmler and Proan˜o 2015). For some countries in the Euro area, where recovery
is weak and deflationary shocks cannot be ruled out in the near future, this may imply serious
consequences. As already indicated above, this may also entail severe consequences for private
sector behavior.
However, the effects of deflation on the economy are not unambiguous. Bordo and Filardo
(2005) analyze the topic of deflation from a historical perspective and come to the conclusion
that deflations are not always linked to an economic downturn. Instead the consequences of
3The high correlation of the private sector credit spread/bond rates with the sovereign bond rates is also stated in
Corsetti et al. (2012) and Blanchard and Leigh (2013). Evidence on the important role of the jumping term spread
is given in section 2.
4The diverse relationship between the yield curve and macroeconomic variables is summarized in Gu¨rkaynak and
Wright (2012): the term structure may be used to interfere market expectations about future interest rates and
inflation. The yield curve also gained additional interest after the outbreak of the financial crisis: as standard
monetary policies are exhausted due to the zero lower bound, attempts to alter long-term interest rates started to
feature more prominently in policy debates. Similarly McCallum (1994) discusses the significance of the yield
curve for aggregate demand via changes in the risk premium, where a fall in the risk premium lowers long-term
rates and increases aggregate demand.
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deflation depend on the state of the economy. Borio et al. (2015) also stress that a mere deflation
of prices of goods and services is not necessarily linked to stagnation. Even more, the weak link
between deflation and an economic downturn, which they observe in their data, can be mainly
attributed to the Great Depression. At the same time, they find strong evidence for severe crisis
due to asset price deflations. Similar points are also made by the ECB (2014): short-lived
deflation is not an uncommon phenomenon in advanced economies after WWII and most of the
time they are not harmful.
However, the experiences of Japan and Hong-Kong in the 1990s and 2000s have shown that
asset-price busts after debt-financed booms lead to balance-sheet adjustments of private and
public sectors with the potential to trigger a harmful and persistent period of deflation. This
process is also summarized by Koo (2014): as a debt-financed boom comes to an end, and asset
prices fall, the attempt to deleverage leads to “unborrowed” savings resulting in a deflationary
gap.5 In such a situation monetary policy becomes ineffective, as private entities are unwilling
to borrow even at very low interest rates and the public sector might have to step up and do the
necessary borrowing and investment.
Of course yields on sovereign debt become an important issue then: if fiscal authorities are
incapable of responding to the crisis due to rising long-term rates, positive feedback effects
might lead to a further decline in income levels and an intensification of deflationary pressure.
Because of this decisive role of credit expansion and rising debt during booms, we are taking
it explicitly into account. Section 3.2 presents a theoretical model with financial market stress,
while section 4 takes the banking sector stress variables – as part of the general stress index
– into account, as we are estimating a multi-regime VAR with financial stress as the threshold
variable. Our threshold variable is the ZEW Financial Condition Indices (FCI) and is taken from
Schleer and Semmler (2013).6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant literature on
the topic and provides some stylized fact. Section 3 presents a theoretical model to explain how
a debt deflation with high credit spread can be turned into a contractionary regime with high
insolvency risk of households, firms and the sovereign, creating a high financial stress regime
with adverse macro feedback effects. Section 4.1 outlines the multi regime econometric methods
used and section 4.2 discusses the empirical results of our regime change analysis. Our results
are summarized in section 5.
2. Further Literature and Stylized Facts
As already mentioned in the introduction, Fisher (1933) presents his idea of debt-deflation as an
explanation of the Great Depression. In a state of (nominal) over-indebtedness, the attempt to
deleverage and increase one’s net-worth leads to a contraction of the money supply and velocity.
As a consequence prices fall which depresses net-worth even further. Moreover, with falling
profits, reductions in output and employment follow and bankruptcies and pessimism may lead
to an additional slow down in the velocity and supply of money. In the end the deflationary
process leads to increasing real debt levels and disturbances in interest rates, where nominal
5A similar argument is made by Minsky (2013) (see section 2).
6See appendix B for a discussion of the data used in this study.
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interest may fall, but real interest rates rise. As von Peter (2005) notices, Fisher’s approach was
novel as he extended the known linkage between deflation and increasing real debt and discusses
repercussions of financial stress on deflation. Thereby he introduces second round effects of debt
deflation which makes the process inherently unstable.
Fisher’s idea of debt deflation didn’t catch on in mainstream macroeconomics for a long time.
As Bernanke (1995) remarks, debt-deflation was only seen as a redistribution from debtors
to creditors and severe macroeconomic effects were disregarded, although exceptions can be
found. Tobin (1975), for example, argues that the redistribution would affect aggregate demand
if marginal propensities to spend from wealth differ between creditors and debtors. In case of
a higher propensity to spend from wealth for debtors, aggregate demand would decrease and
aggravate an economic downturn. Additional deflationary pressure would be the result. Minsky
(2013) incorporates asset markets in his theory of debt deflation where distress selling of assets
to pay off debt reduces asset prices even further. This process may trigger another round of
fire sales and price deflation in asset markets. Minsky also recognizes that this vicious circle
might be reinforced as debtors default on their obligations, leading to capital losses for credi-
tors and an additional weakening of aggregate demand. Similar arguments can also be found in
Kindleberger and Aliber (2011).
Bernanke (1983) also takes up the topic of debt deflation and analyzes its effects on the bank-
ing system. He argues that a mere redistribution might be the case in normal circumstances, but
a large deflationary shock will result in bankruptcies of debtors and a deterioration in assets of
lenders. Reallocation of assets towards safer securities – and the lack of credits to riskier debtors
– will then result in a credit contraction. This will lead to a persistent downturn and a decline
in aggregate demand which intensifies the deflationary pressure. However, as von Peter (2005)
argues, the process of debt-deflation in Bernanke (1983), as well as in Tobin (1975), is only a
propagation mechanism which inhibits the system from returning to its equilibrium frictionless.
Similar effects can also be found in standard macroeconomic models (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler
1989) which use to incorporate financial market conditions via the financial accelerator model,
where falling net-worth of borrowers during an economic downturn increases agency costs of
financing real capital investments, thereby deepening the downturn. Extensions of the financial
accelerator models (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Bernanke et al. 1999) show how small
shocks hitting the economy are magnified by financial markets imperfections. However, the
financial accelerator only perturbs the adjustment process towards the steady state and shocks
are of a temporary nature in these models. Similarly Christiano et al. (2004), in an attempt to
model the Great Depression, build a DSGE model with assets, which can be used as collateral,
debt, defaults and debt-deflation and deviations from the steady state due to a fall in investment
and consumption. Still, propagation mechanism are linearized and large shocks are necessary to
model the Great Depression, while stability considerations are not dealt with.
In contrast Sannikov and Brunnermeier (2010) develop a model where dropping asset prices
depress investment demand which leads to a further decline in asset prices. These feedback
effects keep the economy out of equilibrium and an adjustment towards the steady state is not
necessarily given. They come to the conclusion that the behavior of the economy differs substan-
tially between periods where financial markets are operating normally and periods of financial
stress. Empirical evidence can be found in similar studies (e.g. Mittnik and Semmler 2013;
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Semmler and Chen 2014), where it is shown that the state of financial markets plays a crucial
role with respect to the propagation of shocks. Similarly Schleer et al. (2014) develop an index
of optimal leverage for 40 banks in Europe and show that credit and output contractions due to
a lending shock are more severe during a period of overleveraging than during “normal times”.
While the studies of debt deflation discussed so far focus on the effects of debt-deflation on
the deepening of an economic downturn in terms of output, von Peter (2005) focuses on asset
holding adjustments. In his overlapping generations model firms are active for three periods
where revenues are only collected in the last period, such that firms have to borrow to buy assets
in the first period. After a redistributive shock – which leads to debt-deflation – firms start selling
their assets to reduce their indebtedness in the final period. However, distress-selling changes
prices and causes second round effects of asset sales. Still, the dynamics of the model remain
stable as firms without any debt are willing to increase their borrowing. On the other hand,
Fisher (1933) and Minsky (2013) argue in favor of a destabilizing process which results from
excess indebtedness. Debt deflation doesn’t only act as a propagation mechanism, but becomes
an endogenous characteristic of the economy.
While the studies discussed so far primarily focus on private indebtedness, we focus on the
cost of public sector debt represented by the term structure. The dynamics of bond yields and
macroeconomics variables have been studied before. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) estimate a VAR
with real growth, inflation, the term structure and latent variables where identifying restrictions
are informed by no arbitrage conditions. They come to the conclusion that macroeconomic fac-
tors explain movements of bond yields well, where effects of an inflation shock are the strongest
in the short end of the yield curve. Evans and Marshall (2007) confirm the results of Ang and
Piazzesi (2003). However, while latter stress the linkage for short- and medium-term yields,
Evans and Marshall (2007) also find a significant relationship for long-term bonds. They come
to the conclusion that macroeconomic factors account for most of the movement of yields up to
5 years.
Since we are particularly focusing on the Euro area and the feedback of long term interest
rates and debt deflation, we want to highlight some facts of how the credit spread between short
and long rates evolved after the meltdown 2008. Let us remind the reader, however, that the
rise of credit spreads as Williams and Taylor (2009) describe in their study for the US, occurred
exactly the same way in the Euro area. But the financial meltdown of 2008 has shown that
the sovereign countries within the Euro area were evaluated differently by investors during that
economic downturn, which is reflected by strong yield differentials between countries.7
While Germany, for example, is regarded as a save investment, many peripheral countries
suffered from drastic increases in risk premia after the financial meltdown. Thus we are taking
account of country heterogeneity within the Euro area and distinguish between core countries –
which are represented by Germany and France – and peripheral countries – exemplified by Italy
and Spain. The development of the term spread8 since 2009 for all four countries of our study
are also depicted in figure 1. As can be seen, especially Spain suffered more from increasing
7Different country risk perceptions by investors within the Euro area were of course already recognized before the
recent financial crisis. For example, Codogno et al. (2003) show that bond yields in Spain and Italy rise relative
to German bond yields due to an increase in international risk factors.
8For the rise of the private credit spread, we can cite again Corsetti et al. (2012) and Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
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long interest rates, compared to Germany and France.
(a) Germany (b) France
(c) Spain (d) Italy
Figure 1: Spread of long-term over short-term interest rate since first quarter of 2009
The database is discussed in appendix B. Though overall, as we can observe in figure 1, the
spread for all countries go up after the meltdown of 2008, for the Northern countries such as
France and Germany spreads soon decline, whereas for the South, for Spain and Italy spreads
reach a second peak after 2012 which continue to be a peril since then. As we will demonstrate
later, the regime dependent impulse responses will show a similar pattern.
3. A monetary policy macro model
Above we have argued that the secular stagnation effect from debt deflation in the Euro area
may be rather slowly developing but the major threat is that a debt deflation, accompanied by a
lack of economic growth, rising real interest rates and further rising debt, may trigger household
defaults, defaults of firms, default risk of certain sectors of the economy or sovereign defaults.
It is this rising default and financial crisis risk then that may lead to a regime of a slowly moving
7
debt crisis with threat of banking insolvency, high financial market stress and a rapid rise of risk
premia, credit spreads and persistently high term spread.
In order to give some foundation of what actually may appear as a threat, and in order to give
our empirical study some foundation in a monetary policy macro model with an IS equation,
a nonlinear Phillips curve, a Taylor rule, as monetary policy rule, we explore a model variant
without and one with a financial stress regime. The second model variant reflects a regime
switching,9 moving from little to high financial stress. The first model variant may reflect the
fact that the central bank is able to reduce, or suppress, financial market stress and reduce credit
spreads through QE, but in the second variant not: rather a slow moving debt crisis may evolve.
In both model variants we use a Taylor monetary policy rule and track the output gap and infla-
tion rates.
We employ here the widely used Svensson (1997) model, which, however, is formulated there
in discrete time, exhibiting linear response coefficients. We extend this model by building in
regime changes in the financial market. Yet, we use here a continuous time version as formu-
lated in Werning (2011) and will discretize the model when solving it with a new numerical
procedure, with NMPC, that allows for a finite decision horizon, see Gru¨ne et al. (2013). In con-
trast to previous models that work with infinite time horizon we present a model variant based
on a finite decision horizon.
We pursue a more realistic strategy and build a model based on a short-term behavior of agents
that allows for regime changes. The infinite horizon framework implies a pronounced smooth-
ness in the evolution of the choice variables by construction, as discussed by Gru¨ne et al. (2013).
As usual we have a central bank objective function and linear state equations in the first version.
Then we introduce regime changes affecting the state equations which leads to our second ver-
sion.
3.1. Model variant without financial market stress
Using the Svensson (1997) macro model with linear response coefficients of the state equations,
we define the feedbacks of the output gap and inflation rate to both the inflation rate in the
Phillips curve and to output in the IS equation. The dynamics will be presented first by using the
basic Svensson (1997) model. Since there are two state equations there may already be cyclical
– and not only unidirectional – change of inflation and output.
Accordingly, eqs. (6.2)-(6.5) in Svensson (1997) can be written in continuous time for shorter
time horizon as10
V (pi,y) = minit,
ˆ T
0
e−ρt
1
2
((pit −pi∗)2+λy2t )dt (1)
subject to
p˙it = α1pi+α2yt (2)
9Note that in DSGE models regime switches are also perceived as something likely to occur which some literature
starts to explore now, see Farmer et al. (2009).
10For details of how such type of short decision horizon model can approximate models with longer time horizons
well on the basis of much less information for the agents see Gru¨ne et al. (2013).
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y˙= β1yt −β2(it −pit − r) (3)
In equ. (1) there is a quadratic penalty function which has to be minimized by choosing an
interest rate it , as the central bank’s decision variable, which may be bounded by zero. Whereas
pit is the actual inflation rate, the term pi∗ represents the target inflation rate for the central bank.
There is a weight λ attached to the output gap. The parameter ρ defines the discount rate.
Note that equ. (2) represents the Phillips curve as a differential equation that defines the
response of the change of the inflation rate to the inflation rate and output gap. As in Svensson
(1997), those reaction coefficients, α1 ≤ 0, α2 > 0 are assumed to be constant. Equ. (3) is the
continuous time form of the IS equation representing the output gap, yt given the log of actual
output, y minus potential output, y∗. The change of the output gap is driven by the output gap
and the excess of the real interest rate over the natural interest rate r, this excess being zero at
the steady state. Equ. (3) is also a differential equation with constant coefficients, with β1, ≤ 0
β2 > 0. Note our model (1) - (3) is written in a way that resembles the New Keynesian model
version in continuous time as in Werning (2011). The latter derives the continuous time form
from an approximation of the Euler equation of a nonlinear model with preferences, as used in
New Keynesian literature on monetary policy models. In Werning (2011) however, the inflation
rate responds negatively to the output gap, since he uses a forward looking inflation expectation
term driving the actual inflation in a Phillips curve relationship of inflation and output.
Since such a view does not perform well in empirical estimations, see Ball and Mazumder
(2014) and Gordon (2011), we use here the Svensson (1997), and Rudebusch and Svensson
(1998) version for the Phillips curve. Note that the New Keynesian literature also uses an infinite
horizon version of the optimal control problem. We here employ a finite horizon decision model
which presumes some limited information agents in the sense of Sims (2006).
From figure 2 we observe that the potential output at 2 and the output gap zero at 2, for all
three initial conditions the inflation rate (vertical axis) and output gap (horizontal axis). We can
observe small inflation rates in the region of a negative output gap (see region from 1.5 to 2) and
a faster rising inflation rate in the region of a positive output gap, where the economy operates
beyond full capacity. Thus figure 2 shows already the linear coefficient PC creates, through the
feedback effects between output gap, inflation and interest rate, not necessarily a linear PC in the
sense of some empirical studies. As figure 2 shows inflation rates can move to zero – our steady
state benchmark case – but if there is no or little financial market stress and no credit spread
arising, the rise of real interest rates due to disinflation or deflation, might not matter much, as
the central bank may bring down the short term nominal rate as well the credit spreads.11 This
results corresponds also to Borio et al. (2015) who show that debt deflation becomes a problem
if the financial market with asset price fall is involved.
11There maybe a zero bound to the interest rate that the central bank could face, but in our view it is more the danger
of the rise of insolvency risk, default premia and jump credit spread that may be the actual danger, see next
section.
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Figure 2: Potential output at 2 and output gap zero at 2, for the initial conditions chosen, the
inflation rate (vertical axis) and output gap (horizontal axis): One observes small in-
flation rates in the region of negative output gap (see region from 1.5 to 2) and faster
rising inflation rate in the region of positive output gap
3.2. Model variant with financial stress regime
In the next variant we discuss the case when there might be a switch from some normal regime
with positive output gap and inflation rate to a period with negative output gap, disinflation or
deflation and a regime change to financial stress, insolvency risk, rising risk premia and rise of
credit spreads. In the normal regime, as depicted in figure 2, there is no financial market stress,
and thus no credit spread. Next we want to allow for regime switching as it is demonstrated to
be present in other empirical work and discussed in section 2 (see also Schleer and Semmler
2013).
We study a model of regime switching in the IS curve where the actual credit cost, due to
rising risk premia, is assumed to move up in a recessionary regime giving rise to financial stress
and credit spreads. Inflation rates may also move differently in negative output gap and positive
output gap scenarios.12 We can employ a regime dependent IS curve as follows:
y˙= β1yt −β2(it +δ (yt)−pit − r) (4)
δ (yt) = µ, for y< 0 (5)
12See Gross and Semmler (2015).
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δ (yt) = 0, f or y> 0 (6)
Thus the regime switching occurs in the linkage of output gap and risk premia, giving rise to
credit spreads to be born by firms, households, and/or the sovereign, in a recession. Although
the accelerator term, β1, is the same in equ. (4) as in equ. (3), the output gap itself is impacted
by the rising credit spread.
Figure 3: Regime dependent IS equation; potential output at 2, the output gap zero at 2, initial
conditions pi(0) = 0.04 and output gap y(0) = 0.5, inflation rate (vertical axis) and out-
put gap (horizontal axis): In the region of a negative output gap, δ (y) = µ = 0.12, for
negative output gap regime change to high financial stress causes output to fall, gener-
ating disinflation and deflation, then recovery triggers inflation again, until contraction
with financial stress re-emerges.
In figure 3 the model with regime switching is solved. As before, potential output is at 2
and the output gap is zero at 2, for initial condition pi(0) = 0.04 and output gap y(0) = 0.5.
The inflation rate (vertical axis) and output gap (horizontal axis) are shown for the region of a
negative output gap.
We observe a small response of inflation rates to the output gap in the region of a negative
output gap. In the region of a positive output gap, a strong response of inflation to a positive
output gap is observable; see the region to the right of the zero output gap, thus there is a weakly
changing inflation rate, but there is a strongly changing inflation rate to the right of the zero
output gap. Moreover, a huge change of the negative output gap, actual output moving from 0.9
to 2 is needed, to change the inflation rate from 0.01 to -0.011, whereas the same change occurs
already with an overutilization of capacity going from zero to 0.5.
As to the effects of the regime dependent IS equation, with initial conditions pi(0) = 0.04
and output gap y(0) = 0.5, we observe in the region of a negative output gap, regime switching:
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output remains negative for a long time, with δ (y) = 0.12. We have modeled this as a regime
change, arising from an insolvency threat, financial market stress, and rise of credit risk and
credit spread in the region of a negative output gap. High financial market stress and credit spread
cause output to fall, generating disinflation and slight deflation. Thus a process of disinflation
or deflation will go hand in glove with a faster decrease of prices but persistent loss of output
and employment. Then a recovery maybe slowly emerging with rising inflation rate. So, overall,
it is this regime change to financial market stress and credit spreads that is the real peril in
a deflationary period, possibly generating a protracted period of a negative output gap. This
is what what we want to estimate next in an econometric regime change model with regime
dependent effects of shocks.
4. Multi Regime VAR Results
4.1. Methodology
Linear VAR and orthogonal impulse responses build on strict assumptions concerning the dy-
namics of the model. It is implicitly assumed that the responses do not change irrespective of
the state of the economy. Furthermore, the orthogonalized impulse responses lead to feedback
effects which are symmetric with respect to the sign of the shock, linear in terms of their size
and independent of the history of the economy (Koop et al. 1996).
However, it has been argued above that the response of an economy changes with respect to
financial market conditions. Our model with financial market stress presented in section 3.2 also
shows how stress in financial markets influences the behavior of an economy. From an empirical
point of view such a model can be evaluated by a multi-regime autoregression (Tong 1978; Tong
1983). In a multivariate setting a multi-regime VAR (MRVAR) can then be defined the following
way (cf. Tsay 1998; Mittnik and Semmler 2012):
yt = ci+
p
∑
j=1
Ai jyt−j+ εit if τi−1 < rt−d ≤ τi (7)
where yt = (y1t , . . . ,ynt) and ci is a vector of regime-dependent constants. τ represents the
threshold values and rt−d is the threshold variable which may or may not be included in yt, while
d represents the threshold delay with d≥ 1. Additionally it is assumed that εit ∼NID(0,Σi) and i=
1, . . . ,M.
As can be seen from equ. (7), a multi-regime VAR defines a piecewise-linear VAR for M+ 1
distinct regimes where the threshold variable rt−d defines the state of the economy. The multi-
regime VAR outlined in equ. (7) also exhibits interesting characteristics from a theoretical and
empirical perspective. From a theoretical point of view it allows us to model state-dependent
behavior of economic relations, while its relatively simple structure allows for estimation by
least-squares conditional on the threshold variable rt−d .
Like in the case of a linear VAR model, we are interested in the effects of shocks to certain
endogenous variables on other endogenous variables. However, as discussed above, orthogonal
impulse responses are inappropriate for non-linear models. Therefore generalized impulse re-
sponse functions (GIRF) (Koop et al. 1996) will be used here, which are capable of capturing
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asymmetries and history dependence of shocks to the system. The GIRF are defined as follows:
GIRFy(n,Vt ,Ωt−1) = E[yt+n|Vt ,Ωt−1]−E[yt+n|Ωt−1] (8)
where Ωt−1 is the history/state of the economy at a specific point in time. In our case, where
we are estimating a MRVAR with p lags,Ωt−1 consists of yt−1, . . . ,yt−p, whileVt depicts a shock
to a specific variable of our system and n represents the forecast horizon. The procedure can be
briefly summarized as follows:13 we split our data set into subsets of observations according
to the regimes they belong to. Then we take a regime i and a random starting value from i
and simulate the model with bootstrapped (regime-specific) residuals. We repeat the simulation
with the same starting value and bootstrapped residuals, but we add an additional shock to one
variable in the starting period. This procedure is repeated R− times for a given starting value
and randomly drawn residuals and afterwards the average of the simulations is computed. By
the law of large numbers as R→ ∞, the simulations converge to the conditional expectations
given in (8).
We repeat this procedure l− times for regime i, where the starting values are drawn randomly
from the subset of observations of regime i with replacement. The simulation is then undertaken
for each regime on its own which gives the regime-dependent GIRF.
4.2. Empirical Analysis
In our analysis we build on a four dimensional MRVAR where yt consists of change in GDP,
inflation rates, the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates and the FCI, where
the FCI also acts as the threshold variable. Thus we estimate a MRVAR with an endogenous
threshold variable. As mentioned before, we use here the spread between the long and the short
interest rate because of the high covariation of the term spread and the private credit cost.14
As already discussed in the last section, a threshold model enables us to take nonlinearities
with respect to financial market conditions into account. As an alternative, one could also model
the nonlinearities using a Markov switching model (MSVAR) as in Hamilton (1989). However,
in MSVAR models states of the economy are not observable and therefore don’t have an obvious
interpretation, while we are assuming that the (observable) FCI is capable of distinguishing be-
tween low stress and high stress regimes in financial markets. The a priori definition of regimes,
and the possibility of classifying observations according to the regimes they belong to, makes
the MRVAR also more fruitful for policy analysis (see also Mittnik and Semmler 2012).
However, before estimating the model, we have to test for threshold effects first. We use
the test developed by Lo and Zivot (2001) to test the null hypothesis of linearity against the
alternative of threshold effects. The test was conducted with 1000 bootstrap replications for
each country and a trimming value of 0.2 which guarantees that each regime contains at least
20% of all observations. The results are shown in tables (1) through (4). As can be seen, we
are testing a linear model against two different alternatives, namely a model with one threshold
and a model with two thresholds. However, as our number of observations are rather limited
with a total of 129 observations, we decided to estimate a model with only one threshold for
13A detailed algorithm for computing the generalized impulse responses is described in appendix A.
14See again Corsetti et al. (2012) and Blanchard and Leigh (2013).
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all countries. The use of one threshold is appropriate for Germany, Spain and Italy, but not for
France, as can be seen from the tables. Although the tests would suggest a linear model for
France, we decided to estimate a MRVAR for reasons of comparison for France as well.
As in the case of the linearity test, we use a trimming value of 0.2 for the MRVAR estima-
tion as well. The threshold value, as well as the threshold delay, are obtained by a grid search,
where the sum of squared residuals (SSR) is minimized. The lag length choice is informed by
the Schwarz criterion, where the lag length is constant across regimes for each country. The
Schwarz criterion suggests a lag length of one for each country and the SSR are minimized with
a threshold delay value of one as well. The estimation results are shown in tables (9) through
(12), where change in GDP is ordered first (y1t ), the inflation rate is ordered second (y
2
t ), fol-
lowed by the interest rate spread (y3t ) and the FCI (y
4
t ). Moreover, the threshold values of our
estimates are indicated in the tables by Th.
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR(1) 38.91684 42.79938 47.95230 54.10266 42.66837 0.05200
Crit. Value MRVAR(2) 70.42317 76.34283 80.29903 89.37402 59.62706 0.32800
Table 1: Germany: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR(1) and MRVAR(2)
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR(1) 41.07914 45.40710 47.66195 52.55821 25.4118 0.6650
Crit. Value MRVAR(2) 72.96317 78.31620 81.58928 87.77751 54.32389 0.57700
Table 2: France: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR(1) and MRVAR(2)
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR(1) 40.96873 45.07202 48.99541 51.11692 49.2769 0.0200
Crit. Value MRVAR(2) 75.78246 81.95585 85.05443 90.21488 86.4230 0.0200
Table 3: Spain: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR(1) and MRVAR(2)
90% 95% 97.5% 99% Test Statistic P-Value
Crit. Value MRVAR(1) 42.83848 45.74163 51.35114 54.48933 56.25111 0.00600
Crit. Value MRVAR(2) 76.56803 82.64711 87.84411 96.85304 90.32876 0.02000
Table 4: Italy: Test of linear VAR against MRVAR(1) and MRVAR(2)
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 y1ty2t
y3t
y4t
=

( 0.0025
0.0030
0.0005
0.2385
)
+
(−0.0617 0.1571 0.8876 0.0007
0.1079 0.4640 −0.3612 −0.0002
−0.0128 −0.0160 0.8632 −2.7e-05
−2.0734 −16.7613 13.5007 1.0469
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th < 0.8654
(−0.0069
0.0069
0.0008
−0.2172
)
+
(
0.0551 1.1776 2.5727 −0.0017
0.0470 0.3310 −0.8237 −0.0005
−0.0181 −0.1385 0.9118 0.0001
12.8580 46.1625 −158.1838 0.9248
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th > 0.8654
(9)
Table 5: MRVAR(1) for Germany
 y1ty2t
y3t
y4t
=

( 0.0034
0.0038
0.0006
−0.1234
)
+
(
0.1630 −0.0379 0.4128 2.4e-07
−0.1302 0.7306 −0.1869 0.0009
0.0163 −0.0041 0.8200 0.0002
−13.5918 −16.9884 34.8983 0.7596
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th < 0.6360
(−0.0020
−0.0011
0.0011
1.4409
)
+
(
0.4200 0.2393 0.7852 −0.0008
0.0088 0.9886 0.4100 −0.0003
−0.0147 −0.0382 0.7338 0.0002
−20.8828 −28.1160 −161.0134 0.7839
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th > 0.6360
(10)
Table 6: MRVAR(1) for France
 y1ty2t
y3t
y4t
=

( 0.0018
0.0022
0.0016
0.4454
)
+
(
0.6112 −0.0450 0.2651 −0.0005
0.3279 0.3097 −0.2591 −0.0010
−0.0473 −0.0422 0.7500 0.0002
−39.9579 8.5823 −76.8477 1.0030
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th <−0.6317
( 0.0006
0.0026
0.0009
0.2009
)
+
(
0.8777 0.0134 −0.0680 0.0001
−0.0347 0.8042 −0.1756 0.0002
−0.0544 −0.0769 0.5760 0.0011
−41.5978 −2.3862 −26.0725 1.0491
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th >−0.6317
(11)
Table 7: MRVAR(1) for Spain
 y1ty2t
y3t
y4t
=

( 0.0010
0.0012
0.0004
−0.0916
)
+
(
0.1643 0.0369 −0.2186 −0.0011
0.0103 0.7872 −0.0273 −0.0006
−0.0104 −0.0056 0.8484 0.0002
−28.9487 10.0175 −2.3704 0.8848
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th <−0.0725
(−0.0062
0.0015
0.0035
1.2107
)
+
(
0.2550 0.1468 2.3656 −0.0030
0.0141 0.9418 −0.1367 1.8e-05
−0.0291 −0.0963 0.4025 0.0003
5.9333 −43.7088 −176.0144 1.0726
) y
1
t−1
y2t−1
y3t−1
y4t−1
 if Th >−0.0725
(12)
Table 8: MRVAR(1) for Italy
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As we are interested in the effects of deflationary shocks on the term structure, we simulate the
GIRF with a negative shock to inflation of one standard deviation in the next step. Figures(4) -
(7) display the effects of a deflationary shock for Germany, France, Spain and Italy, where 90%
confidence bands are also shown. The response of the spread during tranquil periods is depicted
on the left for all four countries, while the right graphs show the responses during a time of
financial stress.
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Figure 4: Germany: Response of interest rate spread to deflationary shock of 1 s.d.; low stress
regime left, high stress regime right
As already discussed in the introduction, Bordo and Filardo (2005) and Borio et al. (2015) find
evidence that the effects of deflations depend on the state of the financial market. If asset prices
fall and default risk rises, financial risk has a magnifying effect in case of a deflationary process.
When taking a look at the impulse responses, we see that during a “tranquil” period the spread
increases initially in Germany, but remains rather small. In the long run the effect fades out and
becomes slightly negative. Also for France, the spread increases initially. The effect is stronger
than in Germany. But eventually the spread decreases. The initial effects are stronger in Italy
and Spain, than in Germany and France. Furthermore, while the spread moves towards zero for
Italy, it becomes negative in Spain.
The effects change dramatically in a situation of financial risk and financial stress. While the
spread in Germany and France rises initially, it starts declining in Germany after 4 quarters and
in France after 8 quarters. For Spain and Italy the results are very different during a period of
economic stress as can be seen from figures 6 and 7. While the spread reaches its maximum
for Spain after 4 quarters as well and starts declining afterwards, it stabilizes at a higher level
compared to Germany and France, while Italy is experiencing the largest spread of all countries
with a very slow recovery. In the end, default and financial risk and stress seem to be connected
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Figure 5: France: Response of interest rate spread to deflationary shock of 1 s.d.; low stress
regime left, high stress regime right
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Figure 6: Spain: Response of interest rate spread to deflationary shock of 1 s.d.; low stress
regime left, high stress regime right
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Figure 7: Italy: Response of interest rate spread to deflationary shock of 1 s.d.; low stress regime
left, high stress regime right
with a much stronger rise in the risk premia in the peripheral countries of the Euro area compared
with the two core countries.
5. Conclusion
As demonstrated in the paper there is a wide spread concern in the Euro area that there might
be perils of a deflationary process in Europe. The Euro area is currently under threat of a debt
deflation and secular stagnation. Though empirical evidence seems to suggest that secular stag-
nation and debt deflation in the Euro area maybe be rather slow, yet what appears as major peril
is that the debt deflation with a lack of economic growth, rising real interest rates and further
rising debt may trigger household defaults, defaults of firms and banks, default risk of certain
sectors of the economy or sovereign default threats. It is this rising default and financial crisis
risk that may lead to a regime of a slowly moving debt crisis with perils for the banking sector,
high financial market stress and a rapid rise of risk premia and credit spreads. In order to ex-
plore those issues a macro policy model of Svensson type is introduced, exhibiting a regime of
low and high financial stress. We then employed a four dimensional multi-regime VAR on Euro
area time series data on output, inflation rate, financial market stress and credit spread between
long and short interest rates. The empirical results on the multi regime VAR for the Euro area
time series data support the theoretical model and the claim that in particular Southern Euro area
countries are affected by debt deflation combined with default and financial market risk.
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A. GIRF algorithm
We follow the approach of Caggiano et al. (2015) in computing the GRIF. The algorithm works
the following way:
1. Consider the set of all observations which contains T = 129 observations and runs from
1980Q4 until 2013Q1. This allows us to build T − p+ 1 histories. With a lag length
of p = 1 this implies that we have 129 histories to draw from (with replacement). The
histories are split into M regime-subsets (Ω1, . . . ,ΩM) according to the regime they belong
to.
2. Take a set of histories (Ωi) out of one of the M subsets from step (1) and compute the
regime-dependent Variance-Covariance Matrix Σi.
3. Cholesky decompose Σi which gives Σi = CiC′i and orthogonalize the regime-dependent
residuals to get the structural shocks: ei =C−1i εi
4. Draw a history ω j ∈Ωi.
5. From ei draw a set of n four-dimensional structural errors e∗i = (eit , . . . ,eit+n) with re-
placement, where the contemporaneous correlation of the structural errors is taken into
account. Afterwards transform the residuals back into their reduced form representation:
ε∗i =Cie∗i .
6. Use the history from step (4) and the structural errors from step (5) to simulate the model
with the parameters from the MRVAR model.
7. Take the structural errors from step (5) and add an additional shock in period t : evi =
(eit + vt , . . . ,eit+n). Then compute the reduced form errors as in (5).
8. Use the history from step (4) and the structural errors from step (7) to simulate the model.
9. Repeat steps (5) through (8) R= 100 times and take the average of the simulations from
step (6) and from step (8). The difference of the averages represents the GIRF for history
j.
10. Repeat steps (2) through (9) l = 500 times for regime i where the histories are drawn from
Ωi with replacement. Take the average over all estimated GIRF i (GIRF i,1, . . . ,GIRF i,l)
which represents the GIRF for regime i.
11. Repeat steps (2) through (10) for all regimes to get the GIRF for all M regimes.
12. The confidence intervals are computed by taking the 5% and 95% percentile of the densi-
ties of the simulated GIRF (GIRF1, . . . ,GIRF l) for each regime.
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B. Data
Our dataset was constructed from two data sources. The first three variables (change in GDP,
inflation rate and the interest rate spread) were taken from the GVAR project (Smith and Galesi
2014). Therefore our data is based on the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database where
change in GDP is the first difference of real GDP (Concept: Gross Domestic Product, Real
Index, Quarterly, 2005 = 100) and the inflation rate corresponds to Consumer Prices, All items,
Quarterly, 2005 = 100. The interest rate spread is calculated as the difference between long-
term and short-term interest rate, where the long-term interest rate corresponds to Interest Rates,
Government Securities, Government Bonds concept, while the short term interest rate is taken
from Interest Rates, Treasury Bill Rate.
Our fourth variable, the ZEW Financial Condition Indices (FCI), which acts as the endogenous
threshold variable in our MRVAR model, is taken from Schleer and Semmler (2013). The index
represents financial sector conditions and stress with a focus on the banking sector. The index
covers the banking sector, securities markets and foreign exchange markets.
A more detailed description of the data can be found in Smith and Galesi (2014) and in Schleer
and Semmler (2013).
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